UNC4841: the Pro-China threat actor behind exploitation of Barracuda ESG Zero-Day Vulnerability
A suspected pro-China threat group, UNC4841, has been identified as the perpetrator of data-theft attacks on Barracuda Email Security Gateway (ESG) appliances. The group exploited a now-patched zero-day vulnerability, CVE-2023-2868, to gain unauthorized access and steal sensitive data.
Mandiant, a leading cybersecurity firm, has tracked and linked UNC4841, a hacking group known for conducting cyber espionage attacks on behalf of the People’s Republic of China, to a series of targeted data breaches. The attacks specifically targeted Barracuda ESG appliances, leveraging a recently patched zero-day vulnerability.
According to Mandiant’s report, the threat actors initiated their operations around October 2022, utilizing the CVE-2023-2868 vulnerability to execute remote command injections within Barracuda’s email attachment scanning module. This allowed them to install previously unknown malware onto vulnerable appliances and exfiltrate sensitive data.
The vendor, Barracuda Networks, discovered the flaw on May 19th and promptly released a security advisory, urging affected users to apply the necessary updates. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) also issued an alert, advising U.S. Federal agencies to implement the security patches.
In an unusual move, Barracuda decided that impacted customers should replace their devices entirely rather than reimage them with new firmware. The decision was made due to the group’s sophisticated tactics, which compromised the devices at a deep level, making it difficult to guarantee their complete cleanliness.
John Palmisano, Mandiant Incident Response Manager, explained
“Due to the sophistication displayed by UNC4841 and lack of full visibility into all compromised appliances, Barracuda has elected to replace and not reimage the appliance from the recovery partition out of an abundance of caution. This strategy ensures the integrity of all devices in situations in which Barracuda is unable to ensure the recovery partition was not compromised by the threat actor.”
UNC4841 employed a multi-stage attack chain, starting with sending malicious emails containing specially crafted ‘.tar’ file attachments. These attachments, often masquerading as ‘.jpg’ or ‘.dat’ files, exploited the vulnerability in Barracuda ESG devices when scanned. The exploitation of CVE-2023-2868 enabled the threat actors to execute system commands on the affected devices, granting them remote access.
Mandiant’s report further elaborated
“It effectively amounts to unsanitized and unfiltered user-controlled input via the $f variable being executed as a system command through Perl’s qx{} routine. $f is a user-controlled variable that will contain the filenames of the archived files within a TAR. Consequently, UNC4841 was able to format TAR files in a particular manner to trigger a command injection attack that enabled them to remotely execute system commands with the privileges of the Email Security Gateway product.”
Once inside the compromised Barracuda ESG devices, UNC4841 deployed various malware families, including ‘Saltwater,’ ‘Seaspy,’ and ‘Seaside,’ to carry out their data exfiltration activities. These malwares were specifically designed to steal email data and occasionally gain further access within the victim’s network.
The hackers went to great lengths to evade detection, modifying their malware and diversifying their persistence mechanisms after Barracuda released patches. UNC4841 conducted a series of targeted attacks from May 22nd to May 24th, 2023, focusing on vulnerable devices of government agencies and prominent organizations across 16 countries.
To establish persistence, the threat actors utilized cron jobs and backdoored Barracuda SMTP daemon (bsmtpd) modules such as ‘Saltwater,’ ‘Seaspy,’ and ‘Seaside.’ Additionally, they employed a Linux-based module called ‘Seaspy’ to monitor SMTP commands and a tool called ‘Whirlpool’ for TLS reverse shell capabilities. The group also deployed a process-hiding technique named ‘Sandbar’ to conceal its malicious activities.
Mandiant’s analysis revealed that UNC4841 selectively targeted specific organizations, including the ASEAN Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAs), foreign trade offices, and academic research organizations in Taiwan and Hong Kong. These entities were subjected to focused data exfiltration, indicating the group’s specific interest in sensitive information from these regions.
Given the group’s capability to adapt and diversify their tactics, Mandiant emphasizes the need for heightened vigilance. It is recommended that all compromised Barracuda ESG appliances be replaced, irrespective of their patch level.
Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
IPs/Domains/SHA |
---|
101.229.146.218 |
103.146.179.101 |
103.27.108.62 |
103.77.192.13 |
103.77.192.88 |
103.93.78.142 |
104.156.229.226 |
104.223.20.222 |
107.148.149.156 |
107.148.219.227 |
107.148.219.53 |
107.148.219.54 |
107.148.219.55 |
107.148.223.196 |
107.173.62.158 |
137.175.19.25 |
137.175.28.251 |
137.175.30.36 |
137.175.30.86 |
137.175.51.147 |
137.175.53.17 |
137.175.53.170 |
137.175.53.218 |
137.175.60.252 |
137.175.60.253 |
137.175.78.66 |
139.84.227.9 |
155.94.160.72 |
182.239.114.135 |
182.239.114.254 |
192.74.226.142 |
192.74.254.229 |
198.2.254.219 |
198.2.254.220 |
198.2.254.221 |
198.2.254.222 |
198.2.254.223 |
199.247.23.80 |
213.156.153.34 |
216.238.112.82 |
23.224.42.29 |
23.224.78.130 |
23.224.78.131 |
23.224.78.132 |
23.224.78.133 |
23.224.78.134 |
37.9.35.217 |
38.54.113.205 |
38.54.1.82 |
38.60.254.165 |
45.63.76.67 |
52.23.241.105 |
64.176.4.234 |
64.176.7.59 |
bestfindthetruth[.]com |
fessionalwork[.]com |
gesturefavour[.]com |
goldenunder[.]com |
singamofing[.]com |
singnode[.]com |
togetheroffway[.]com |
troublendsef[.]com |
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