LitterDrifter: a new USB worm used by the Gamaredon group
The Russian cyber espionage group Gamaredon, affiliated with Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), has been observed using a worm called LitterDrifter, which spreads through USB devices in targeted attacks against Ukrainian entities. This tactic signifies an evolution in the group’s attack methodologies, known for their large-scale campaigns followed by efforts to collect targeted data, likely motivated by espionage objectives.
The LitterDrifter worm stands out for two main characteristics: its automatic spread via connected USB drives and communication with the threat actor’s command and control (C&C) servers. It is suspected to be an evolution of a PowerShell-based USB worm previously disclosed by Symantec in June 2023. Written in VBS, the propagation module is responsible for distributing the worm as a hidden file on a USB drive along with a deceptive LNK shortcut assigned random names.
Gamaredon’s approach to C&C servers is rather unique, using domains as placeholders for circulating IP addresses that are actually used as C2 servers. LitterDrifter is also capable of connecting to a C&C server retrieved from a Telegram channel, a tactic repeatedly employed since the beginning of the year. Symantec has detected signs of possible infections outside Ukraine, with VirusTotal submissions from the United States, Vietnam, Chile, Poland, Germany, and Hong Kong.
Gamaredon has had an active presence this year, continuously evolving its attack methods. In July 2023, the opponent’s rapid data exfiltration capabilities came to light, with the transfer of sensitive information within an hour of the initial compromise. “It’s clear that the LitterDrifter worm is designed to support a large-scale collection operation, and Gamaredon is an active part of it,” the company concluded. “It leverages simple yet effective techniques to target the widest possible range of objectives in the region.”
ATT@CK Tecniques
Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Enterprise | T1583 | .001 | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains | Gamaredon Group has registered multiple domains to facilitate payload staging and C2. |
Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Gamaredon Group has used HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications. |
Enterprise | T1119 | Automated Collection | Gamaredon Group has deployed scripts on compromised systems that automatically scan for interesting documents. | |
Enterprise | T1020 | Automated Exfiltration | Gamaredon Group has used modules that automatically upload gathered documents to the C2 server. | |
Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | Gamaredon Group tools have registered Run keys in the registry to give malicious VBS files persistence. |
Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | Gamaredon Group has used obfuscated PowerShell scripts for staging. |
.003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell | Gamaredon Group has used various batch scripts to establish C2 and download additional files. Gamaredon Group’s backdoor malware has also been written to a batch file. | ||
.005 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic | Gamaredon Group has embedded malicious macros in document templates, which executed VBScript. Gamaredon Group has also delivered Microsoft Outlook VBA projects with embedded macros. | ||
Enterprise | T1485 | Data Destruction | Gamaredon Group has used tools to delete files and folders from victims’ desktops and profiles. | |
Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | Gamaredon Group has collected files from infected systems and uploaded them to a C2 server. | |
Enterprise | T1039 | Data from Network Shared Drive | Gamaredon Group malware has collected Microsoft Office documents from mapped network drives. | |
Enterprise | T1025 | Data from Removable Media | A Gamaredon Group file stealer has the capability to steal data from newly connected logical volumes on a system, including USB drives. | |
Enterprise | T1491 | .001 | Defacement: Internal Defacement | Gamaredon Group has left taunting images and messages on the victims’ desktops as proof of system access. |
Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Gamaredon Group tools decrypted additional payloads from the C2. Gamaredon Group has also decoded base64-encoded source code of a downloader. | |
Enterprise | T1568 | Dynamic Resolution | Gamaredon Group has incorporated dynamic DNS domains in its infrastructure. | |
Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | A Gamaredon Group file stealer can transfer collected files to a hardcoded C2 server. | |
Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Gamaredon Group macros can scan for Microsoft Word and Excel files to inject with additional malicious macros. Gamaredon Group has also used its backdoors to automatically list interesting files (such as Office documents) found on a system. | |
Enterprise | T1564 | .003 | Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window | Gamaredon Group has used hidcon to run batch files in a hidden console window. |
Enterprise | T1562 | .001 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools | Gamaredon Group has delivered macros which can tamper with Microsoft Office security settings. |
Enterprise | T1070 | .004 | Indicator Removal: File Deletion | Gamaredon Group tools can delete files used during an operation. |
Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Gamaredon Group has downloaded additional malware and tools onto a compromised host. | |
Enterprise | T1559 | .001 | Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model | Gamaredon Group malware can insert malicious macros into documents using a Microsoft.Office.Interop object. |
Enterprise | T1534 | Internal Spearphishing | Gamaredon Group has used an Outlook VBA module on infected systems to send phishing emails with malicious attachments to other employees within the organization. | |
Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location | Gamaredon Group has used legitimate process names to hide malware including svchosst. |
Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | Gamaredon Group has removed security settings for VBA macro execution by changing registry values HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office<version><product>\Security\VBAWarnings and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office<version><product>\Security\AccessVBOM. | |
Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | Gamaredon Group malware has used CreateProcess to launch additional malicious components. | |
Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Gamaredon Group has delivered self-extracting 7z archive files within malicious document attachments. | |
.001 | Binary Padding | Gamaredon Group has obfuscated .NET executables by inserting junk code. | ||
.004 | Compile After Delivery | Gamaredon Group has compiled the source code for a downloader directly on the infected system using the built-in Microsoft.CSharp.CSharpCodeProvider class. | ||
.010 | Command Obfuscation | Gamaredon Group has used obfuscated or encrypted scripts. | ||
Enterprise | T1137 | Office Application Startup | Gamaredon Group has inserted malicious macros into existing documents, providing persistence when they are reopened. Gamaredon Group has loaded the group’s previously delivered VBA project by relaunching Microsoft Outlook with the /altvba option, once the Application.Startup event is received. | |
Enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery | Gamaredon Group tools have contained an application to check performance of USB flash drives. Gamaredon Group has also used malware to scan for removable drives. | |
Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment | Gamaredon Group has delivered spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to targets. |
Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | Gamaredon Group has used tools to enumerate processes on target hosts including Process Explorer. | |
Enterprise | T1021 | .005 | Remote Services: VNC | Gamaredon Group has used VNC tools, including UltraVNC, to remotely interact with compromised hosts. |
Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task | Gamaredon Group has created scheduled tasks to launch executables after a designated number of minutes have passed. |
Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | Gamaredon Group’s malware can take screenshots of the compromised computer every minute. | |
Enterprise | T1608 | .001 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware | Gamaredon Group has registered domains to stage payloads. |
Enterprise | T1218 | .005 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta | Gamaredon Group has used mshta.exe to execute malicious HTA files. |
.011 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 | Gamaredon Group malware has used rundll32 to launch additional malicious components. | ||
Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | A Gamaredon Group file stealer can gather the victim’s computer name and drive serial numbers to send to a C2 server. | |
Enterprise | T1016 | .001 | System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery | Gamaredon Group has tested connectivity between a compromised machine and a C2 server using Ping with commands such as CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c ping -n 1. |
Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | A Gamaredon Group file stealer can gather the victim’s username to send to a C2 server. | |
Enterprise | T1080 | Taint Shared Content | Gamaredon Group has injected malicious macros into all Word and Excel documents on mapped network drives. | |
Enterprise | T1221 | Template Injection | Gamaredon Group has used DOCX files to download malicious DOT document templates and has used RTF template injection to download malicious payloads.[10] Gamaredon Group can also inject malicious macros or remote templates into documents already present on compromised systems. | |
Enterprise | T1204 | .002 | User Execution: Malicious File | Gamaredon Group has attempted to get users to click on Office attachments with malicious macros embedded. |
Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | Gamaredon Group has used GitHub repositories for downloaders which will be obtained by the group’s .NET executable on the compromised system. | |
Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | Gamaredon Group has used WMI to execute scripts used for discovery. |
Indicators of Compromise
HASH/Domain |
---|
cbeaedfa84b02a2bd41a70fa92a46c36 |
6349dd85d9549f333117a84946972d06 |
2239800bfc8fdfddf78229f2eb8a7b95 |
42bc36d5debc21dff3559870ff300c4e |
4c2431e5f868228c1f286fca1033d221 |
1536ec56d69cc7e9aebb8fbd0d3277c4 |
49d1f9ce1d0f6dfa94ad9b0548384b3a |
83500309a878370722bc40c7b83e83e3 |
8096dfaa954113242011e0d7aaaebffd |
bbb464b327ad259ad5de7ce3e85a4081 |
cdae1c55ec154cd6cef4954519564c01 |
2996a70d09fff69f209051ce75a9b4f8 |
9d9851d672293dfd8354081fd0263c13 |
96db6240acb1a3fca8add7c4f9472aa5 |
1c49d04fc0eb8c9de9f2f6d661826d24 |
88aba3f2d526b0ba3db9bc3dfee7db39 |
86d28664fc7332eafb788a44ac82a5ed |
1da0bf901ae15a9a8aef89243516c818 |
579f1883cdfd8534167e773341e27990 |
495b118d11ceae029d186ffdbb157614 |
ozaharso[.]ru |
nubiumbi[.]ru |
acaenaso[.]ru |
atonpi[.]ru |
suizibel[.]ru |
dakareypa[.]ru |
ahmozpi[.]ru |
nebtoizi[.]ru |
squeamish[.]ru |
nahtizi[.]ru |
crisiumbi[.]ru |
arabianos[.]ru |
gayado[.]ru |
quyenzo[.]ru |
credomched[.]ru |
lestemps[.]ru |
urdevont[.]ru |
hoanzo[.]ru |
absorbeni[.]ru |
aethionemaso[.]ru |
aychobanpo[.]ru |
ayzakpo[.]ru |
badrupi[.]ru |
barakapi[.]ru |
boskatrem[.]ru |
brudimar[.]ru |
decorous[.]ru |
dumerilipi[.]ru |
heartbreaking[.]ru |
judicious[.]ru |
karoanpa[.]ru |
lamentable[.]ru |
procellarumbi[.]ru |
ragibpo[.]ru |
raidla[.]ru |
ramizla[.]ru |
samiseto[.]ru |
superficial[.]ru |
talehgi[.]ru |
undesirable[.]ru |
valefgo[.]ru |
vasifgo[.]ru |
vilaverde[.]ru |
vloperang[.]ru |
zerodems[.]ru |
geminiso[.]ru |
vilaverde[.]ru |
lamentable[.]ru |
raidla[.]ru |
boskatrem[.]ru |
heartbreaking[.]ru |
sabirpo[.]ru |
valefgo[.]ru |
vasifgo[.]ru |
absorbeni[.]ru |
vloperang[.]ru |
decorous[.]ru |
ramizla[.]ru |
procellarumbi[.]ru |
andamanos[.]ru |
triticumos[.]ru |